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Abstract
The size of the informal sector is commonly associated with low per capita
GDP and a poor business environment. Recent episodes of reform and growth
in several African countries appear to contradict this pattern. From the mid
1980’s onward, Ghana underwent dramatic liberalization and achieved steady
growth, yet average ﬁrm size in the manufacturing sector fell from 19 to just
9 employees between 1987 and 2003. I use a new panel of Ghanaian ﬁrms,
spanning 17 years immediately post-reform, to model ﬁrm dynamics that
diﬀer markedly from well-established ‘stylized facts’ in the empirical literature
from other regions. In contrast with American and European ﬁrms, entry of
new ﬁrms and selection on observable characteristics, rather than within-ﬁrm
growth, dominates industrial evolution in Ghana.
1. Introduction
The size of the informal sector is commonly associated with low per capita GDP and
a poor business environment. Market deregulation (Besley and Burgess, 2004; Botero,
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, and Shleifer, 2004; de Soto, 1989), enforcement of
property rights (Beck, Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt, and Levine, 2003; Kumar, Rajan, and Zingales,
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for their assistance accessing the National Industrial Census; Moses Awoonor-Williams for organizing
various aspects of the survey data collection; Luis Cabral and Jos´ e Mata for assistance reproducing their
earlier results; Ernest Aryeetey, Chris Woodruﬀ and seminar participants at the IZA/WB Conference
on Employment and Development for comments; and to my supervisor Francis Teal for consistent input.
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CSAE WPS/2010-051999), and low rates of taxation and bribe extraction are commonly thought to contribute
to the emergence of larger, formal enterprises.
The recent track record of several African economies calls these patterns into ques-
tion. Beginning in the mid 1980s, Ghana launched one of the most ambitious structural
adjustment programs in Africa, abolishing price controls, opening capital markets, slash-
ing tariﬀs, and eventually privatizing the majority of state owned enterprises. These
reforms ushered in a period of sustained economic growth, averaging 4.7% per annum
from 1984 to 2004 (Aryeetey and McKay, 2007). Yet, as I attempt to document below,
over this same period Ghana saw a rapid increase in the relative size of the informal
sector, and a secular decline in the average size of industrial activity. Furthermore, this
pattern seems to be common across sub-Saharan Africa. During the 1990s, all of the
economies for which comparable employment data is available (Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana,
Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania) posted slow but positive growth in per capita GDP, and
all underwent substantial market-oriented reforms in the 1980s and early 1990s. Nev-
ertheless, all of these economies saw substantial increases in the proportion of the non-
agricultural labor force working in the small-scale or informal sector (Kingdon, Sandefur,
and Teal, 2006).
This paper uses data from the manufacturing sector in Ghana to investigate the
determinants of this trend in detail. I study the evolution of the ﬁrm size distribution
in Ghana from 1987 to 2003. The main contribution of the paper is to establish two
signiﬁcant departures from well-documented, international ‘stylized facts’. Both of these
departures highlight the overwhelming importance of ﬁrm entry and selection, and the
irrelevance of within-ﬁrm growth, in understanding industrial evolution in Ghana. In
contrast, much previous research on ﬁrm dynamics in Africa, by focusing primarily on
cross-sections or tracking a ﬁxed panel of existing ﬁrms, has systematically overlooked the
unique patterns of ﬁrm entry and selection that appear to distinguish Africa’s industrial
development.3
Seen in isolation, the recent inﬂux of microenterprises in Ghana could be viewed
as either the harbinger of future industrial dynamism, or a sign that formal sector is in
relative decline. The ﬁrm dynamics documented here provide little basis for optimism.
Based on existing patterns of ﬁrm growth and survival, there is no sign that current
cohorts of new ﬁrms contain the seeds of future large-scale enterprises.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the two
primary data sources used in the analysis: two rounds of an industrial census and a
3The ﬁrm-level panel studies funded by the World Bank through the Regional Program on Enterprise
Development (RPED), and subsequent cross-sectional Investment Climate Assessment (ICA) surveys are
prime examples of frequently-used data sets that have contributed to this blindspot regarding ﬁrm entry.
Notable exceptions include recent work on Ethiopia, using ﬁrm census data (Shiferaw and Bedi, 2009).
212-year panel survey of a sample of ﬁrms. Section 3 relies on graphical analysis to
document the ﬁrst signiﬁcant ﬁnding of the paper: the dominance of selection over
within ﬁrm growth in explaining the apparent life-cycle of ﬁrms, counter to existing
evidence from Europe and elsewhere. Section 4 models the distribution dynamics in
Ghanaian manufacturing using a simple, ﬁrst-order, homogenous Markov chain. The
Markov model allows me to recover entry rates, and to place overall patterns of job
creation and reallocation in a comparative international context. Section 5 turns to the
underlying determinants of this trend toward small-scale employment, and the apparent
failure of the common association between liberalization and large scale development. I
test the importance of credit constraints in explaining the low rates of ﬁrm growth at
various points in the size distribution. Results suggest that credit market failures place
a signiﬁcant drag on growth among small ﬁrms, but the relaxation of all such constraints
would be insuﬃcient to overcome the leftward shift in Ghana’s ﬁrm size distribution.
Section 6 concludes.
2. Data
The analysis draws on two primary data sources: (i) two waves of Ghana’s Na-
tional Industrial Census (NIC) – spanning nearly two decades in the immediate wake of
liberalization, 1987 and 2003 – and (ii) longitudinal survey data from a sub-sample of
the 1987 NIC ﬁrms, tracking them from 1991 to 2002.
2.1. Census data
The remarkable feature of the NIC data is the dramatic fall in average ﬁrm size
between the two rounds of the census, indicating a steep trend toward smaller scale
activity.
The second and third rounds of the census were undertaken by the Ghana Statistics
Oﬃce (GSO) in 1987 and 2003, respectively, both with the collaboration of the United
Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). Comprehensive coverage and
synchronized variable deﬁnitions across the two censuses allow for comparisons across
years. The NIC incorporates all manufacturing ﬁrms in the country, spanning both the
formal and informal sector. Household enterprises are excluded, except in cases where
public signs clearly advertise the location of a business enterprise within a residential
dwelling. The NIC is enumerated at the plant level, thus multi-plant ﬁrms are treated as
separate observations. As such multi-plant ﬁrms are likely to be quite rare in Ghana, par-
ticularly in the private sector, I use the terms plant and ﬁrm interchangeably throughout.
At the time of writing, the available variables which are common across census rounds are
extremely limited. They include the establishment name, location (region and town),
and 4-digit International Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (ISIC) codes, and persons
3engaged. Persons engaged includes both employees and unpaid apprentices which con-
stitute a signiﬁcant share of the small-enterprise workforce. Additionally, in 2003 ﬁrm
age is also available, which is central to reconstructing historical entry rates in section
4.4
As seen in Table 1, the ﬁrm size distribution in Ghanaian manufacturing shifted
signiﬁcantly downward between 1987 and 2003. Average ﬁrm size fell from 19 to 9
employees per establishment, while the proportion of employment in small and microen-
terprises (fewer than 30 employees) rose from 33% to 52%.
There is strong evidence this change is genuine, rather than being driven by any
change in the coverage of the census between rounds. At least three pieces of evidence
corroborate the overall pattern of a large reduction in average ﬁrms size. First, as can
be seen in Table 1, the downward shift in the size distribution occurred across all size
categories. Removing ﬁrms with fewer than 10 or fewer than 20 employees – where one
might speculate coverage has improved – does not alter the picture of declining ﬁrm size.
Second, the NIC ﬁgures on employment in the manufacturing sector for 1987 and
2003 closely match the equivalent numbers from the population censuses conducted in
1984 and 2000. As seen in Table 2, the NIC reports 157,084 and 243,516 employees in 1987
and 2003, respectively, while the population census records 137,119 and 229,156 wage
employees and apprentices in the manufacturing sector in 1984 and 2000, respectively –
which rises to 150,708 and 251,866 after adjusting for trend growth in the three year gap
between the population census and NIC. This relatively small discrepancy of just 3 to
4% would make it seem highly improbably that there was severe under-counting in the
1987 NIC. Furthermore, the dramatic expansion in apprenticeship labor – 7.1% annual
growth compared to 1.8% for the labor force as a whole, in an occupational category
usually restricted to small, Ghanaian-owned, informal enterprises, and generally unpaid
– is another indication of increasing informality.
Third, the shift in the ﬁrm size distribution is also corroborated by another in-
dependent data source: the Ghana Living Standards Surveys (GLSS I-IV), a series of
large-scale, household socio-economic surveys conducted in 1987/88, 1988/89, 1991/92
and 1998/99. Kingdon, Sandefur and Teal Kingdon, Sandefur, and Teal (2006) present
a picture of the evolution of the urban labor market in Ghana by linking these four
surveys, tracking the share of the labor force in public versus private sector wage em-
ployment, unemployment and self employment. Between GLSS I (1987/88) and GLSS
IV (1998/99), the share of the urban labor force in self-employment rose from 50% to
4Data from the 1987 NIC is coded according to Revision 2 of the ISIC, while the 2003 NIC uses ISIC
Revision 3, as does the survey data presented in the next section. Because there is no precise translation
of three- and four-digit ISIC codes between revisions – short of reclassifying individual ﬁrms – analysis
is restricted to two digit classiﬁcation, yielding a total of 17 industries.
463%, while private wage employment grew only slightly and the public sector contracted.
Thus the broad picture of increasing informality and a trend toward small-scale activity
is consistent across all available, nationally representative data sets.
2.2. Survey data
The Ghana Manufacturing Enterprise Survey (GMES) collected data on a sample
of ﬁrms over a period from 1992 to 2002. The surveys were conducted by a team from
the Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford, the University of Ghana, Legon,
and the Ghana Statistical Oﬃce (GSO), Accra. The surveys from 1992 to 1994 were part
of the Regional Program on Enterprise Development (RPED) organized by the World
Bank, enabling comparison with similar surveys conducted in other Africa countries over
the same period.
The original GMES sample of 200 ﬁrms was initially drawn from the 1987 NIC,
spanning 10 two-digit ISIC sectors and oversampling larger ﬁrms with more than 100
employees. The survey includes a full production and input data, ﬁrm-speciﬁc input and
output prices, measures of the human capital of workers and management, questions on
access to ﬁnance, taxes and the regulatory environment, etc. Firms were surveyed up to
seven times (in 1992, ‘93, ‘94, ‘96, ‘98, 2000 and 2003) with recall data collected for the
intervening years. As ﬁrms exited they were replaced with new respondents, creating an
unbalanced panel covering a total of 312 ﬁrms for up to 12 consecutive years, 1991-2002.
The mean and median number of observations per ﬁrm are 6.98 and 7, respectively.
Large and small ﬁrms in the survey data use strikingly diﬀerent factor intensities,
have diﬀerent propensities to export, pay diﬀerent prices for both capital and labor, and
face diﬀerent regulatory environments. These systematic diﬀerences provide hints about
both the causes and consequences of the shift in the ﬁrm size distribution shown above.
As seen in Table 3, larger ﬁrms pay substantially higher wages for workers with
similar characteristics. Median monthly wages range from US$ 24.08 for ﬁrms with fewer
than ﬁve employees up to US$ 125.87 for ﬁrms with over 100 workers. While a portion
of this diﬀerence is undoubtedly attributable to higher skilled labor usage among large
ﬁrms, previous studies have found that the remaining ﬁrm-size wage eﬀect for workers
with similar characteristics is still extremely large. Based on earnings equations estimated
for the sector by S¨ oderbom & Teal S¨ oderbom and Teal (2004), a ﬁrm with 100 employees
will pay roughly double the wage of a ﬁrm with 10 employees, controlling for workers’
observed and time-invariant unobserved skills.
While large ﬁrms pay more for labor, there is evidence that they pay signiﬁcantly
less for credit. A simple way to capture these diﬀerences without resorting to econometric
estimation is to measure the implied return to capital for each ﬁrm using data on proﬁts
and the capital stock (Bigsten, Collier, Dercon, Fafchamps, Gauthier, Gunning, Isaksson,
5Oduro, Oostendorp, Pattillo, S¨ oderbom, Teal, and Zeufack, 2003). In a competitive
industry the following zero-proﬁt condition
πit = ptqit − witXit − ritKit =0




where p is the product price, q is real output, w is a ﬁrm speciﬁc vector of input prices,
K measures the capital stock and X is a vector of other factor inputs, including labor.
Table 3 reports this measure of r for ﬁrms in each size class. Applying the zero proﬁt
condition to ﬁrms in our sample implies that medium ﬁrms must pay an eﬀective interest
rate of 58% on capital, compared to an astronomical 1,623% for microenterprises.
Finally, a more direct way to assess credit constraints among ﬁrms is simply to
ask their managers. The bottom of Table 3 reports data from managers’ responses to
the question “What are your three biggest problems this year?”5 The responses across
large- and small-ﬁrm managers conform to a picture of widespread credit constraints
in the informal sector. Credit access is listed as a major problem by nearly 70% of
microenterprises and only 20% of large ﬁrms. Meanwhile, large ﬁrms are eight-times
more likely to complain of interest rates, implying that credit is available for a suﬃcient
cost. These self-reported measures of credit access are employed in the estimation of
ﬁrm growth model in section 5, where I deal explicitly with the problems of endogeneity
and measurement error that such self-reported data poses.
3. Graphical Analysis: Growth vs. Selection
One of the main stylized facts to emerge from the recent empirical literature on
industrial evolution in developed economies is the existence of clear life cycle among
ﬁrms: entering cohorts are relatively small and in their early years ﬁrms either converge
fairly quickly to their long-run size or die (Sutton, 1997). The 2003 Census provides data
on ﬁrm age, which I divide into the following categories: younger than 1 year, 2-4, 5-9,
10-19, 20-29, and 30 years or older. Figure 1 plots nonparametric estimates of the ﬁrm
size distribution in logs by age category using the cross-section of ﬁrms in 2003 Census.6
5Respondents were not prompted or given a list of options. Enumerators coded the replies into one
of twenty-six categories ex post. The data in Table 3 and the variables used in section 5 are dummy
variables taking a value of one if a given issue was listed as either the ﬁrst, second, or third largest
problem.
6Plots are based on an Epanechnikov kernel density smoother. For comparability, all plots use a
bandwidth of 1.
6Consistent with the life-cycle pattern, older ﬁrms are consistently larger than those in
later cohorts.
However, there is an inherent ambiguity in the patterns observed in Figure 1. Using
only a cross-section of ﬁrms, it is impossible to distinguish the hypothesis that younger
ﬁrms grow quickly from the alternative hypothesis of selection: small ﬁrms die more
frequently and thus average size within a cohort increases as it ages.
Cabral and Mata Cabral and Mata (2003) demonstrate a simple graphical method
of distinguishing growth from selection in panel data. Their technique is to compare
three distinct ﬁrm size distributions at two points in time: the period 1 distribution of
all ﬁrms; the period 2 distribution of ﬁrms which survived between rounds; and ﬁnally,
with the beneﬁt of hindsight, the period 1 distribution of ﬁrms which are known to have
survived to period 2.
Figure 2 replicates the test suggested by Cabral and Mata using the Ghana Indus-
trial Census data. 7 The curve with the highest peak shows the distribution of all ﬁrms in
1987/88. The remaining curves plot the size distribution of ﬁrms which survived between
periods, in both the initial round (1988S) and sixteen years later (2003). The relative
position of these last two curves provides a simple test of the selection hypothesis: did
ﬁrms which survived grow during the interim, or were they large to begin with?
The results show that the evolution of ﬁrm size over the life cycle is driven almost
entirely by selection in Ghana. Rather than starting as a representative sample of the
population and growing over time, the Ghanaian ﬁrms which survived from 1987 to 2003
had negative average growth. The rightward shift in the distribution over time is entirely
due to the fact that surviving ﬁrms were abnormally large to begin with. 8
For comparison, I reproduce the analogous ﬁgures from Cabral and Mata 2003, p.
1079 in the left panel of ﬁgure 2. The distributions are based on data from Portuguese
manufacturing ﬁrms, which Cabral and Mata argue are fairly representative of developed
country data sets in terms of their size distribution and evolution. As in Ghana, older
ﬁrms are bigger in the Portuguese data. As seen in the ﬁgure 2 however, the pattern of
growth and selection in this sample is almost precisely the opposite of that observed in
Ghana. The ﬁgure shows that for Portuguese manufacturing ﬁrms, selection (by size)
7Unfortunately, ﬁrm age is not reported in the 1987 census, so I am unable to identify the 1987 cohort
of entrants. Instead, I trace the evolution of the 1987 population of ﬁrms over time. An additional
diﬃculty is encountered in matching ﬁrms between the two rounds of the census, as no unique identiﬁer
is provided. In the end, I were able to match 236 ﬁrms by ISIC code, region, and ﬁrm name.
8It is important to note that the panel of 305 survivors which I identify represents only about 13%
of the ﬁrms in the 2003 census which claimed to have entered in 1988 or earlier. Comparing these 305
to the larger population of alleged survivors, average ﬁrm size is somewhat larger for those I was able to
match. However, this will undermine our conclusion in the text only if these 305 ﬁrms grew signiﬁcantly
more slowly than the average for the population of survivors. As shown above, there is no evidence of
large discrepancies between size classes in within-ﬁrm growth rates in Ghana.
7plays a very small role in the evolution of the ﬁrm size distribution. Cabral and Mata
argue that this ﬁnding calls for a reevaluation of the central role given to selection in
much of the theoretical literature on industrial evolution, notably Jovanovic Jovanovic
(1982).
These contrasting ﬁndings have enormous implications for how one views the bur-
geoning SME sector in Ghana. Were the same explosion of entrepreneurial activity taking
place in Portugal, there would be reason to believe that the inﬂux of new ﬁrms contained
the seeds of future large scale industrial development. Such is not the case in Ghana.
Existing evidence suggests that small enterprises die early and small. Conversely, big
ﬁrms don’t represent successful microentrepreneurs that have risen through the ranks of
smaller ﬁrms. Rather, big ﬁrms are born big.
4. Distribution Dynamics
I model the evolution in the distribution of ﬁrm size from 1987 to 2003, which
I denote F1987 and F2003 respectively, using a ﬁrst-order, homogenous Markov chain.
The central conceit of the Markov framework is that a ﬁrm’s fate tomorrow (i.e., its
size, or continued existence) depends only on its status today, with no further role for
history. While this assumption may be questioned in high-frequency data, in transitions
over longer time spans – such as the 16 years used here – growth trajectories will likely
overwhelm any bias due to serial correlation in the data (Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh,
1996).
There are two main objectives to this modelling exercise. First, I use the transition
and exit matrices from the Markov model to reconstruct entry rates and thus measure
gross job ﬂows at various points in the distribution. Second, by allowing for more general
dynamics than in a linear growth model, I can remain agnostic about the shape of the
ergodic distribution of ﬁrm size. This allows me to test hypotheses such as those put
forward by Quah Quah (1997), who ﬁnds that the distribution of per capita incomes
across countries appears to be converging to a bimodal distribution, or common claims
that African ﬁrms exhibit a ‘missing middle’.
The Markov model contains three basic sets of parameters: (i) entry rates of new
ﬁrms, (ii) transition probabilities between size classes for ﬁrms that survive from one
period to the next, and (iii) exit rates. The latter two categories, transition and exit
probabilities, can be estimated fairly directly from the data – and as a result have
been analyzed quite extensively by previous studies – while entry rates must be inferred
somewhat indirectly. This task of inferring entry rates is the main analytical challenge in
estimating a Markov model for Ghanaian ﬁrms. As I hope to show, however, ﬁrm entry
patterns are also the most notable and economically signiﬁcant component of Ghana’s
recent industrial development.
8The census data distinguish nine size categories, allowing me to represent the dis-
tribution of ﬁrm sizes as a vector of nine discrete densities, which I refer to as Ft. The
distribution in year t is linked to the distribution in the following year by a 9×9 matrix
of transition probabilities:
F2003 = M16F1987
=( B + S D)16F1987,
(1)
where subscripts denote the year of observation and superscripts are exponents denoting
the powers of a matrix. The second line decomposes the shift in the distribution into a
vector of ﬁrm entry or “birth” rates B, a matrix of transition probabilities conditional





































The parameters bi and di are birth or death rates, respectively, deﬁned as the number of
ﬁrms entering or exiting a given size class between two periods as a proportion of those
observed in initial period. Element sij of the S matrix denotes the probability that a
ﬁrm starting in size class i will transition to class j. Because the S matrix maps the
distribution of surviving ﬁrms from one period to the next, its rows must sum to one.
This is not the case with the combined M matrix, however, which will incorporate entry
and exit rates.9
4.1. Transition matrices
I use the panel of ﬁrms in both the NIC and GMES data to estimate the S matrix,
or the probability that ﬁrm i beginning in size category p ends up in size category q.
Using a multinomial logit form, this probability is expressed as a function of nine dummy
9It may not be obvious at ﬁrst glance why the decomposition in line (1) is additive with respect to
entry rates and multiplicative with respect to exit rates. Multiplying through the expression element by
























This expression is arguably more intuitive: the number of ﬁrms observed in class 1 in period t is equal
to the new entrants in that class (b1ft−1,1) plus the sum of all ﬁrms moving into or remaining in class 1.
Because transition probabilities are estimated conditional on ﬁrm survival, exit rates must be multiplied
by the original density before allowing for ﬁrm growth.





q exp(βqI(ni,t−1 ∈ p))
(2)
where I(.) is the indicator function, taking a value of one if ni,t−1 falls in size class p
and zero otherwise. These probabilities, spq, correspond to the individual elements of
the transition matrix, S.10
One advantage of the multinomial logit model for this problem is that it imposes the
restriction that all probabilities sum to one. The Markov model also suggests additional
constraints which can be imposed on the β parameters. It is intuitively clear that the
true S matrix should map the original 1987 ﬁrm size distribution to the distribution of
surviving ﬁrms in 2003. However, there is no guarantee that straightforward multimonial
logit estimates of S will satisfy this condition. This is because estimation of (2) relies
only on data from the sample of 305 ﬁrms that can be tracked across both rounds of
the census. To put this more formally, let Fs
2003,t denote the distribution of ﬁrms born
in period t and observed in 2003, i.e., the distribution of survivors from the period t
cohort. This distribution of survivors should reﬂect the cumulative transitions and exits
occuring since period t, such that
Fs
2003,≤1987 =( S D)16F1987. (3)
To improve the ﬁt of the model, it is possible to impose (3) as a constraint on the
likelihood maximization used to estimate (2).11
Table 6 presents estimates of the 16-year transition matrix based on the NIC, using
10Ideally, these probabilities could be estimated for every point on a continuous distribution using, for
instance, a stochastic kernel estimator as advocated by Quah Quah (1997). Such an approach avoids the
need to impose an arbitrary discretization on the distribution, as this may eﬀect the dynamics of the
Markov chain. In the present application, however, the nine discrete size categories used in the analysis
were dictated by the available data.
11The system of equations in 3 is clearly non-linear with respect to βq. I rely on a linear approximation
of these constraints to enable me to implement them with the constraint option on the standard mlogit
command in STATA. In keeping with the earlier notation, let f
s




2003,≤1987 distribution, i.e., the number of ﬁrms born in or before 1987 and observed in 2003 in






spqdpfp,1987 for q =1 ,2,...,9.









q exp(βqI(ni,t−1 ∈ p))
dpfp,1987.
The ﬁrst order Taylor-series approximation of exp(βq) around βq = 0 is simply 1 + βq. However, I am
interested in an approximation to βq around its true value, which may be far from zero. To circumvent
this problem, I assume that the unconstrained estimate of ˜ βq is a reasonably close approximation of the
10the sample of ﬁrms that were tracked between rounds. Starting sizes are listed along the
left hand side and ending sizes are listed on the top of the matrix. Blank spaces represent
zero probabilitiy events. If the distribution is completely stable, all mass should be found
on the diagonal.
There are several notable features about the ﬁgures in the table. First, the modest
average net growth rates observed in the previous section belie a high level of churning in
the ﬁrm size distribution and considerable heterogeneity in growth rates. Firms beginning
in the middle size ranges fan out to virtually all points in the distribution over 16 years.
Second, in the jargon of Markov analysis, the system is said to communicate across
the entire distribution. This simply means that all size classes are, in a probabilistic
sense, achievable from any given starting point over a suﬃciently long span of time (i.e.,
repeated iterations of the matrix). It is signiﬁcant to point out, however, that even
over the fairly long time span used here, there are no observed cases of microenterprises
maturing into large scale employers. Third, the bottom row of the table presents the
ergodic distribution implied by the transition matrix. Assuming inﬁnite lives for all ﬁrms,
there is evidence of an emerging bimodal distribution among Ghanaian ﬁrms. While the
actual realization of this distribution is prevented by ﬁrm death, this pattern is further
evidence that small and large ﬁrms should be understood as fundamentally diﬀerent,
rather than simply occupying diﬀerent points in a life-cycle trajectory.
4.2. Exit rates and the selection process
What role did ﬁrm exit play in the evolution of the ﬁrm size distribution in Ghana
from 1987 to 2003? Even if growth and entry rates were identical across size classes,
the shift in the ﬁrm size distribution over this period may have occurred simply due
to accelerated death rates at the upper end of the distribution. The economic reforms
of the 1980s may have had a particularly harsh eﬀect on large enterprises (Appiah-
Kubi, 2001; Asante, Nixson, and Tsikata, 2000). Liberalization brought the end of many
policies – such as subsidized credit schemes, priority access to foreign exchange, and de
jure product market monopolies – which had previously beneﬁt large ﬁrms. Thus, as a
simple descriptive statistic, it is informative to compare exit rates across size classes. In
addition, these rates are a necessary ingredient in calculating transition and entry rates
in the following sections.
true parameter. This allows me to write
exp(βq) = exp(˜ βq)exp(βq − ˜ βq) ≈ exp(˜ βq)(1 + βq − ˜ βq),
which I use to linearize the system of constraints in (3). Once linearized the constraints can be imple-
mented with standard software packages. Estimation proceeds in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage estimates
of ˜ βq are obtained from unconstrained estimation of (2). These estimates are then used to linearize (3)
and the multinomial model is re-estimated with the approximated constraints.
11I compute ﬁrm exit rates, or the parameters of the D matrix, using the GMES
sample. The GMES data set is well-suited for measuring exit rates as it contains an
indicator variable which distinguishes genuine ﬁrm exits from other forms of sample
attrition, e.g., manager’s refusal to participated in the survey in subsequent rounds,
enumerator’s inability to locate a micro-entrepreneur who may have relocated his or her
business, etc. Such information is not available in the census. Using this variable, I
estimate probit model of ﬁrm exit where the right hand side variables include dummies
for each size class and, in some speciﬁcations, controls for location, ﬁrm age and year of
the survey. The exit probit is estimated over two year intervals, using data from 1991,
1993, 1995, 1997 and 1999.12 Intermediate rounds are based on recall data and thus, by
construction, it is impossible to observe exits in these periods. Size classes are deﬁned in
one of two ways: using ﬁrm employment in the ﬁnal survey round prior to employment,
or using average employment for all rounds in which data are available. The former
measure of ﬁrm size may give misleadingly high exit rates for small ﬁrms if, as found
in other data sets, ﬁrms tend to shrink before dying. Measuring size over all available
periods mitigates this concern.
Table 5 presents the results of the exit probit, giving a simple descriptive view of
ﬁrm exit in Ghana’s manufacturing sector. The large and highly signiﬁcant, negative
coeﬃcient on ﬁrm size in all speciﬁcations reﬂects the simple, unconditional descrptive
statistic that annual exit rates for micro ﬁrms (less than 10 employees) are roughly ten
times higher than for large ﬁrms (more than 100 employees), or 5.1% and 0.6% per
annum respectively. Columns 2 and 3 show that a signiﬁcant life-cycle in ﬁrm survival
is observable only after controlling for ownership variables, and even then is extremely
‘shallow’, with exit rates varying by only one or two percentage points over the life-
cycle. In contrast, state ownership has a strong positive eﬀect on ﬁrm exit, conﬁrming
results in Frazer Frazer (2005). An obvious explanation for this pattern is the divestiture
program carried out during the 1990s, in which many poorly performing ﬁrms were simply
liquidated.13
4.3. Entry rates: Rehabilitating the ‘myth’ that small ﬁrms create most jobs
The past decade of research on job creation and destruction in the U.S. has helped
to dispel the myth that most jobs are created by small ﬁrms. Correcting for the sta-
12I also omit the 2002 round of data from the exit model due to the three-year gap after the previous
round of data collection – in contrast to the two-year span between all other rounds. Uneven spacing
between rounds renders the coeﬃcients on the probit model somewhat diﬃcult to interpret.
13Empirical studies on ﬁrm exit often highlight the role of TFP in determining ﬁrm survival as part
of a process of creative destruction (Jovanovic, 1982; Haltiwanger, Scarpetta, and Schweiger, 2006).
While TFP measurement is beyond the scope of this paper, two recent published empirical papers have
examined the determinants of ﬁrm exit in the GMES sample from this theoretical perspective. Results
suggest that selection on TFP growth may be present, but is particularly weak among microenterprises
S¨ oderbom and Teal (2004); Frazer (2005).
12tistical fallacies described in section ??, the data show the opposite to be true (Davis,
Haltiwanger, and Schuh, 1996). Research on ﬁrms in Africa – including portions of the
GMES data set for Ghana – have reached the same conclusion. Teal Teal (1999) ar-
gues that the dominance of small ﬁrms in job creation is a myth in Ghana as in the
U.S.. Van Biesebroeck (Van Biesebroeck, 2005) compares data from the RPED surveys
in nine countries and concludes that large ﬁrm growth signiﬁcantly outpaces the small
ﬁrm sector.
This section attempts to show that for the case of Ghana, the ‘myth’ that small
ﬁrms create most new jobs is in fact reality. The opposite ﬁnding by earlier studies has
a simple explanation in their common methodology: the analysis of longitudinal surveys
based on a sample of ﬁrms. The primary defect of most panel data sets for studying job
creation is that they systematically ignore new ﬁrm entry. Such longitudinal samples
thus become increasingly unrepresentative of the population over time, due non-random
attrition and the exclusion of new cohorts.
The basic summary statistics from two rounds of the industrial census in Ghana(Table
1) clearly show a dramatic increase in the number of ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector
as a whole. Furthermore, the bulk of this net increase in the ﬁrm population has ended
up in the smallest size categories. Formally speaking however, it is not possible to infer
entry rates from this table. To do so requires making an allowance for growth and tran-
sitions since the time each successive cohort entered. In principle, the increasing mass in
the microenterprise sector in Table 1 could reﬂect a stable pattern of ﬁrm entry over the
past two decades, with a gradual decline in ﬁrm size for existing ﬁrms. Alternatively,
this shift could reﬂect a rapid acceleration of ﬁrms entering and permanently remaining
in the microenterprise sector. In matter of fact, the calculations below show the latter
to be closer to the truth.
Firm entry rates for each year, size, region, and industry cell are calculated by
combining the estimated transition matrix, ˆ S, with estimated death rates, ˆ D, and infor-
mation on the age distribution of ﬁrms in 2003. In addition to the starting and ending
distributions, F2003 and F1987, the 2003 round of the NIC also provides data on ﬁrm age,
allowing me to identify survivors from each annual cohort of ﬁrms – ranging from one
surviving ﬁrm born in 1901 to 2,327 surviving ﬁrms born in 2002. Denote the cohort
of ﬁrms born in period t and surviving until period 2003 by FS
2003,t. Similarly, with the
implicit beneﬁt of hindsight, let FS
t,t equal the cohort of ﬁrms born in t, observed in t,
and destined to survive until 2003. To clarify, these deﬁnitions imply
FS
2003,t =( S D)2003−tFt,t (4)
=( S )2003−tFS
t,t. (5)
Again, the ﬁrst subscript denotes the year a distribution is observed, the second denotes
13the year its members were born. Distributions without a second subscript refer to the
entire population.
Solving equation 5 to recover an estimate of the population and size distribution of
an entering cohort of ﬁrms, FS
t,t, is not straightforward. The ﬁrst obstacle is ﬁnding an
appropriate measure of the inverse of the sixteen-year transition matrix, (S )2003−t.I n
an empirical Markov application, the inverse of a matrix as typically deﬁned by linear
algebraists will produce potentially nonsensical results in economic terms. For instance,
solving equation 5 through simple linear algebra yields a solution implying a negative
number of ﬁrms in several size classes in 1987. This problem is discussed in the appendix.
The simple solution, rather than inverting the S matrix, to estimate it in reverse. Second,
solving equation 5 requires computation of the sixteenth-root of the S matrix. This can
be done both analytically or numerically, and results are presented in the appendix.
With estimates of entering cohort sizes in hand – i.e., estimates of FS
t,t for each year
t between 1987 and 2003 – it is possible to examine gross job creation and destruction
over time. To do so, I decompose employment changes into four mutually-exclusive and
comprehensively exhaustive sources of gross job creation and destruction: job creation
in continuing ﬁrms, JCC; job creation through ﬁrm entry, JCE; job destruction in
continuing ﬁrms, JDC; and ﬁnally job destruction due to ﬁrm exit, JDE. Following




















I(i = exiting ﬁrm) (9)
Table 7 presents these statistics for each available size class. The ﬁrst point to note
is the disproportionate contribution of microenterprises in job creation. While it is true
that among surviving ﬁrms there is no tendency for small ﬁrms to grow faster than large
ﬁrms, there are large disparities in job creation through new ﬁrm entry. Looking at the
extremes, job creation rates via ﬁrm entry for ﬁrms with fewer than ﬁve employees are
over 20% per annum (new jobs in new ﬁrms as a share of last period’s employment), while
the same ﬁgure for ﬁrms with over 500 employees is just 2.3%. While similar disparities
exist in job destruction through ﬁrm exit (8.7% for micro ﬁrms and eﬀectively 0 for the
largest ﬁrms), this gap is insuﬃcient to compensate for the massive inﬂux of new small
and medium enterprises.
14Table 8 attempts to put these ﬁgures in international perspective. Recent work by
Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2005)
and Haltiwanger, Scarpetta and Schweiger Haltiwanger, Scarpetta, and Schweiger (2006)
presents comparable data on the ﬁrm size distribution, job creation and job destruction
in a range of developing and transition countries. However, these papers present no data
for African or other low income countries, thus Ghana makes an interesting compara-
tive case study. As seen in the table, while there is no strong tendency for the share of
ﬁrms or employment in the small-ﬁrm sector to vary with per capita GDP, Ghana ﬁrst
in both these categories. Ghana is the only country on the list with less than half its
manufacturing workforce in the large ﬁrm sector, deﬁned as greater than 50 employees.
However, in terms of both gross and net job reallocation rates by size class, the interna-
tional ﬁeld shows enormous variance, placing Ghana within a fairly standard range. This
includes conforming to a slight tendency for the poorer countries in the list to exhibit
faster growth rates in the small and medium enterprise sector during the 1990s relative
to the large ﬁrm sector.
5. Underlying Determinants of Growth: The Role of Credit Constraints
Why then do the increasingly large, entering cohorts of micro-enterprises docu-
mented above fail to move up through the ﬁrm size distribution? As noted in Section
2, Table 3, the overwhelming response given by owners and managers of small ﬁrms is
a lack of access to credit. This is listed as a major obstacle to ﬁrm growth by just over
69% of both micro- and small-enterprise owners.
This section attempts to take these concerns seriously, presenting a simple model
of the evolution of the ﬁrm size distribution in the presence of credit constraints, and
drawing on the GMES data to estimate the quantitative signiﬁcance of this constraint
in explaining the observed distribution dynamics.
I begin with the production side of a neoclassical model of ﬁrm size (Lucas, 1978).Each
individual in the economy is assumed to have some level of managerial talent, θ, which
will determine the eﬃciency of any ﬁrm he or she manages, and in turn its optimal size.
Production is given by
yit = θh[f(nit,k it)] (10)
where f(.) is a standard production function employing capital and labor, couched within
a managerial technology, h(.), which is assumed to be concave. Proﬁt maximization based
on (10) yields a solution for optimal ﬁrm size measured in employment terms:
n∗
ijt(θij) = argmax{θijh[f(nijt,k ijt)] − wnijt − rkijt}. (11)
The concavity of the h(.) function ensures that the optimal “span of control” for a
15manager with a given talent level is well deﬁned even with an underlying constant-returns
to scale production function.
In the language of the growth literature, I focus on transition dynamics. For the
sake of empirical analysis, I allow that each ﬁrm will have an idiosyncratic long-run
equilibrium growth rate, gij, whose determinants are outside the scope of the analysis
and will be captured in ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects.
I introduce credit constraints as an indicator variable, Cij, denoting the inability to
acquire ﬁnance at the market interest rate. Credit constraints, as I use the term, imply
a market failure. In contrast, ﬁrms which are simply priced out of the market for ﬁnance
by their inability to pay competitive interest rates would not be considered constrained.
Suppose that each entrepreneur is endowed with initial wealth ω, which for sim-
plicity is measured in ﬁrm size units (i.e. the maximum number of employees the en-
trepreneur can aﬀord to hire). This yields a starting ﬁrm size of n∗
ijt if unconstrained and
n(ωij) if constrained – i.e., the largest size permitted by the initial capital endowment.
In the subsequent period, unconstrained ﬁrms will be on their equilibrium growth
path, gij. Firms facing credit constraints, however, will begin the period at an initial
size dictated by their wealth endowment, and will be able to grow only insomuch as the
business generates proﬁts to ﬁnance expansion toward the optimal size n∗
ij. Thus ﬁrm
growth will be a function of credit constraints, past proﬁts, and underlying eﬃciency






¯ gij if Cij =0
min(n∗
ijt(θij) − nij,t−1,π ij,t−1)i f Cij =1
(13)
The equations in (13) state that unconstrained ﬁrms grow at an exogenous rate, while
constrained growth will be the lesser of the gap between current and optimal size, or the
expansion feasible with available ﬁnancing.
The model presents a clear empirical test for the presence of credit constraints: prof-
its should impact growth only for ﬁrms which are suspected to be credit constrained.14
To take the model to the data, as a measure of internal ﬁnance I use the log of ﬁrm
14This result is closely analogous to a central result from the literature on ﬁnance and corporate invest-
ment. Based on q-theory, investment by publicly traded ﬁrms should be independent of internal liquidity
after controlling for the stock market value of the ﬁrm. The signiﬁcance of internal liquidity measures in
investment equations has been widely interpreted as an indication of capital market ineﬃciencies (Fazzari,
Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988).
16proﬁts per employee in the base year. To measure credit constraints, I employ the self-
reported data on managers’ complaints summarized in section 2. This yields the following
empirical analog of equation (13),
Δnijt = β0 + β1 ˜ Cijt + β2 lnπij,t−1+
β3( ˜ Cijt × lnπij,t−1)+Xk,ijtβk + υijt
(14)
where i indexes ﬁrms, j denotes the industrial sector, X is a vector of controls and υijt
is a stochastic error term.
There are two primary econometric challenges in identifying the impact of credit
constraints on ﬁrm growth in equation (14). The ﬁrst is measurement error. The survey
questionnaire contains a very coarse measure of self-reported credit access. If some
genuinely constrained ﬁrms fail to mention this in the interview – or vice versa – the
estimates of the impact of credit constraints will be biased toward zero.15
The second, more conceptual econometric problem stems from the joint determina-
tion of credit constraints and ﬁrm performance. A rational lender will use all available
information to assess the expected proﬁtability and risk proﬁle of a loan application –
and by extension, the probability of repayment. This will likely include current and past
business performance, including ﬁrm growth. Thus any observed negative correlation
between credit constraints and ﬁrm growth may reﬂect a causal relationship in either
direction.
My empirical strategy to identify the causal eﬀect of credit constraint in the presence
of these two sources of bias – measurement error and reverse causation – is to distinguish
between putatively exogenous sector speciﬁc constraints and ﬁrm level idiosyncracies in
reporting. This approach is similar to recent work by Fisman and Svensson Fisman and
Svensson (2007) who use self-reported bribery data to investigate the impact of corrup-
tion on ﬁrm performance in Uganda. Decompose the ‘raw’ credit constraint response –
the binary variable ˜ Cij – into two components, the sectoral average indexed by j and an
idiosyncratic component indexed by i.
˜ Cij = Cj + Cij (15)
Now consider the two sources of bias discussed above. If the data contain independent,
mean zero, measurement error across ﬁrms, this error will be restricted to the Cij compo-
nent. Similarly, for the sources of simultaneity bias, if credit access is driven by speciﬁc
15It may of course be optimistic to assume that measurement error is random. One might hypothesize
that individual ﬁrms which are simply ineﬃcient relative to their competitors and unable to aﬀord
ﬁnance, will report credit constraints. The instrumentation strategy employed here will remove the eﬀect
of these non-random measurement errors as well, essentially by ignoring any ﬁrm-speciﬁc idiosyncratic
component to the credit constraint measure.
17knowledge of an individual ﬁrm’s eﬃciency or growth potential, this will again be cap-
tured in the Cij term. In contrast, exogenous sources of credit constraints are likely to
be constant across ﬁrms in a similar sector, size class or region. For instance, if credit
is rationed because of legal diﬃculties in enforcing repayment in the informal sector, or
because the ﬁxed costs of lending cannot be justiﬁed by the small loans demanded by
small ﬁrms, these eﬀects will be common across ﬁrms in the same sector-size-region cell.
In short, endogenous variation is largely captured in the idiosyncratic ﬁrm-level
variation in ˜ Cij, while diﬀerences across j cells are putatively exogenous. This suggests
that local means of the credit constraint variable will serve as a valid instrument for
ﬁrms’ own reports in equation 14.
A similar problem – and a similar solution – arise in the measurement of proﬁts
as well. Cross-sectional and time-series variation in proﬁts may arise for any number of
reasons, many of which can be treated as exogenous for the purposes of an employment
growth regression. For instance, transitory ﬂuctuations in demand, relative prices, input
availability or costs will constitute a shock to proﬁts which should not aﬀect the ﬁrm’s
optimal scale. Other sources of variation in proﬁts are more problematic. Variations in
market power between ﬁrms, growth in technical eﬃciency for a given ﬁrm relative to
its competitors, and so on should produce eﬀects on ﬁrm growth independent of credit
constraints. Measurement error in ﬁrms’ proﬁts accounts is of course also a concern.
Once again, I rely on sector averages to instrument ﬁrm level proﬁts in equation
(14). Decomposing proﬁts in a similar fashion to line (15), the sector speciﬁc component
of proﬁts, πj, captures forces that are arguably exogenous to the ﬁrm. It is possible to
conceive of scenarios which will invalidate this instrument – for instance, a permanent
technological shock raising the productivity and optimal scale of all ﬁrms in a given
sector. It should be noted, however, that there is no reason to expect such a shock
to have a disproportionately positive eﬀect on credit constrained ﬁrms. Thus ﬁnding
a positive coeﬃcient on β3 remains a putatively valid test for the importance of credit
constraints.
Estimates of equation 14 show strong support for the model in the previous section.
Table 9 presents various speciﬁcations of this basic model using the GMES data. The
OLS point estimates in column 1 conform to the basic predictions of the model, although
the results are insigniﬁcant. The insigniﬁcant association between the credit constraints
indicator and ﬁrm growth is perhaps surprising, but ﬁts with the story of endogeneity
above. If managers who are particularly eager to expand their ﬁrms are those which
complain of credit constraints, this may mask the true negative impact of the market
failure. Additionally, simple noise in this self-reported measure of constraints will also
bias the point estimate toward zero and insigniﬁcance.
The left side of Table 9 presents instrumental variables estimates of the growth
18equation, using as instruments the average values of the credit constraint variable within
a ﬁrm’s sector, size class and region. As with the OLS, the IV point estimates in column
3 conform to the basic predictions of the model. In this case, however, the magnitude of
the eﬀects is dramatically increased and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. On their own,
log proﬁts still have eﬀectively zero correlation with ﬁrm growth. The instrumented
credit constraints variable now shows an even larger negative correlation with growth
(coeﬃcient of -1.24) and the interaction between credit constraints and log proﬁts is
signiﬁcant and positive. Adding ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects to the model in column 4 prevents
the estimation of the simple credit constraints eﬀect, as this variable does not change
over time, but conﬁrms the pattern of interactions with log proﬁts. This pattern of
coeﬃcients is consistent with a model in which ﬁrms gradually overcome lack of credit
access by ﬁnancing expansion through internal proﬁts.
Finally, it is worth considering how far these these estimated eﬀects can explain the
collapse of average ﬁrm size and the long run tendency toward a right-skewed ﬁrm size
distribution identiﬁed in section 4. The predicted values from the regressions give some
indication that the actual economic importance of these eﬀects may be quite modest.
The average predicted values from the growth model in column 3 for ﬁrm with fewer
than 10 and greater than 100 employees are approximately -3.7% and 1.9%, respectively.
I simulate the relaxation of credit constraints by re-calculating predicted growth rates,
setting the credit constraint variable (and its interaction with proﬁts) to zero for all
ﬁrms. The predicted rate for small ﬁrms rises from -3.7% to -2.1%, while that for large
ﬁrms is virtually unchanged at 1.9% and 1.5% with and without constraints, reﬂecting
the near absence of credit constraints in this size class. What is noteworthy is that, while
the gap between small and large ﬁrms for these ‘unconstrained’ growth rates is reduced,
the diﬀerence is not dramatic. Importantly, they suggest that even a major intervention
to overcome credit market failures would be insuﬃcient to produce convergence between
large and small ﬁrms or correct the right skewness in the ergodic ﬁrm size distribution.
6. Conclusions
In 1994 the World Bank published a widely cited review of reform eﬀorts in Africa
(World Bank, 1994), written partly as a response to critics who argued that Bank-funded
structural adjustment programs had entailed social displacement and industrial decline
(Stewart, Lall, and Wangwe, 1992). In the discussion of industrial development, the
report drew on the ﬁrst three rounds of the RPED surveys in Ghana to defend the track
record of liberalization.
The picture in Ghana, the country with the most extensive adjustment, is
not one of stagnation and deindustrialization; instead, it shows much activ-
ity, particularly among smaller enterprises not included in oﬃcial statistics.
(World Bank, 1994, p. 149)
19In short, the early RPED studies were already pointing to the boom in microenterprise
activity. The report acknowledged, however, that there was not – circa 1994 – suﬃcient
evidence to fully investigate the impact of liberalization on industrial development or job
creation.
The big question is whether the activity of small ﬁrms is a structural
break with the past or simply a sign of distress. Are many of the smaller
new entrants simply household eﬀorts to survive at the margin, or are they
dynamic new enterprises that can signiﬁcantly increase employment in the
future? (World Bank, 1994, p. 152)
More than a decade later, data now exist to answer this question. Two clear
departures from existing ‘stylized facts’ in the literature emerged from the analysis of
ﬁrm entry, growth and exit between 1987 and 2003. First, contrary to previous studies
on African data sets which have ignored ﬁrm entry (and a wealth of evidence on U.S.
data), I ﬁnd that microenterprises accounted for the bulk of gross and net job creation
over the period from 1987 to 2003. Massive new entry of small ﬁrms drove average ﬁrm
size in the sector down by over 50%. Second, contrary to ﬁndings from developed country
data sets, these entering ﬁrms do not appear destined to become medium or large scale
enterprises over time. It is selection, rather than within-ﬁrm growth, that drives the
apparent ‘life-cycle of ﬁrms’ observed in cross-sectional data.
The contrast with results from developed country data sets on this front is extremely
telling. Were the same explosion of entrepreneurial activity taking place in Portugal,
there would be reason to believe that the inﬂux of new ﬁrms contained the seeds of
future large scale industrial development. Such is not the case in Ghana. Existing
evidence suggests that small enterprises die early and small. Conversely, big ﬁrms don’t
represent successful microentrepreneurs that have risen through the ranks of smaller
ﬁrms. Rather, big ﬁrms are born big.
The ﬁnal part of the paper examined the potential for improvements in the function-
ing of credit-markets to promote growth among small and microenterprises. Instrumental
variables estimates provide compelling evidence that credit constraints constitute a sig-
niﬁcant drag on ﬁrm growth. Rather than dissipating over time, these constraints have
a permanent eﬀect on the ﬁrm size distribution and may contribute to signiﬁcant ineﬃ-
ciencies in resource allocation. However, the importance of credit constraints should not
be oversold. My econometric evidence suggests that removing such constraints would be
insuﬃcient to overcome the downward slide in the ﬁrm size distribution. Further analysis
of the role of credit constraints at the point of ﬁrm entry may shed additional light on
this topic.
From a policy perspective, the Ghanaian experience calls into question the assumed
link between market reforms and the decline of the informal sector, or the emergence of
a robust large-ﬁrm sector. Additionally, policy prescriptions stressing credit market in-
terventions to overcome slow-growth among microenterprises require further justiﬁcation
20as credit constraints cannot fully account for the right skewness in the Ghanaian data.
From a methodological perspective, the main lesson of this paper is the need to account
explicitly for ﬁrm entry in the analysis of industrial dynamics. In the design of future
data collection eﬀorts, one simple improvement would be to rely on rolling panels that
account for changes in the broader distribution of ﬁrms, rather than relying exclusively
on cross-sections or tracking a ﬁxed sample of ﬁrms, as in most existing panel data sets
from low-income countries.
Appendix: Further Details on the Calculation of Entry Rates
A. Reversing the Markov Chain
To calculate the distribution of entering ﬁrm cohorts it is necessary to solve equation
5 to recover an estimate of FS
t,t. Simplifying notation for illustrative purposes, I rewrite
this equation as
Ft = StF0
so that the goal is to recover F0. Solving for F0 is complicated by the fact that St is
estimated with error. Due to this measurement error, it is clear that
F0 = S−tFt and
=   S−t   Ft, but
 =   S−tFt, (16)
where hats denote empirical estimates, S−t is the matrix inverse of St, and St is in
turn the tth power of the S matrix. Even if the transition matrix is estimated with
reasonable precision,   St ≈ St, the expression in line (16) may fail to provide even a
rough approximation to the F0 distribution. This is because the process of inverting an
estimated matrix will magnify the eﬀect of measurement error exponentially.
The solution is to estimate the transition matrix in reverse, which I label St
r. This
‘reverse matrix’ is based on a multinomial logit model, identical to equation 2, but with
the dependent and independent variables transposed – i.e., starting size classes are a
function of ending size classes. Thus element mn of the St
r matrix gives the probability
of beginning in size class m conditional on ending up in size class n. Using this calculation
I can empirically conﬁrm that F0 ≈   St
rFt. Estimates of   St
r based on the NIC data for
the sixteen year span from 2003 to 1987 are presented in the top panel of Table 10.
Mathematically, these two distinct matrices – the algebraic inverse and the ‘reverse
transition matrix’ – represent just two of the inﬁnite possible solutions to the system of
equations embodied in 5. Crucially, the reverse matrix is the solution suggested by the
data.
21B. Using the Markov Chain to Estimate Entering Cohorts
Using the estimates of the sixteen-year reverse transition matrix, it is possible to
recreate the implied initial distribution of ﬁrms at time zero (in this case, 1987) based
on the distribution in time t (2003). While this is empirically uninteresting – as the 1987
distribution is directly observed – it is possible to use the same method to recreate the
distribution of ﬁrms at other points in time that are not directly observable.
In particular, I am interested in estimating the distribution of entering cohorts –
the distribution of ﬁrm size in, say, 2002 of ﬁrms born in that same period. To do
so, I begin with the distribution of ﬁrms born in 2002 which survived until 2003. The
distribution of these survivors has clearly evolved since entry, both through exit and size
class transitions. To recreate their initial distribution, I multiply the ending distribution
by the one-year reverse transition matrix and the inverse of the death matrix, as implied
by equation 5. To estimate entering cohorts in a give year, t, by this method requires an
estimate of the transition probabilities over the time period 2003 − t. These transition
probabilities can be calculated as the roots and powers of the   St
r matrix.
C. Calculating Roots and Powers of the Markov Chain
Deﬁne the square-root of a matrix S, such that S = S1/2S1/2.I f S is a diagonal
matrix, its square root can be formed by taking the square root of each of its individual
diagonal entries. The same procedure holds for any square matrix that is diagonalizable.
The q×q matrix S is diagonalizable if there is a matrix V such that D = V −1SV is
a diagonal matrix. If S has q independent eigenvectors, V can be formed by the matrix
whose columns are these q eigenvectors. Diagonalization presents an eﬃcient method for
calculating the powers, or roots, of a matrix, as
S1/2 = V −1D1/2V
and so on for other powers of S.
In empirical applications, an alternative method to this diagonalization is to rely
on a numerical approximation. Let Y0 = S and Z0 = I(q), the q × q identity matrix.







k + Zk) (18)
Yk converges quadratically to the square root of S.
22The bottom panel of Table 10 reports the sixteenth-root of the reverse transition
matrix in the top panel, based on the Denman-Beavers algorithm. As a check, I also
calculated the same matrix by diagonalization using a mathematical software package
(Maple) and reached an indistinguishable result. The estimates in Table 10 are used as
the basis to calculate entering cohorts in section 4 of the main text.
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26Table 1: Census Data on Manufacturing Firms
1987 2003
Size Firms % Emp. % Firms % Emp. %
1-4 2,884 35 7,400 5 14,352 55 35,834 15
5-9 3,391 41 21,264 14 7,829 30 48,982 20
10-19 1,101 13 14,306 9 2,427 9 30,784 13
20-29 310 4 7,235 5 541 2 12,405 5
30-49 232 3 8,594 5 401 2 14,538 6
50-99 191 2 13,116 8 287 1 18,270 8
100-199 114 1 15,866 10 124 0 16,819 7
200-499 74 1 22,596 14 87 0 26,240 11
500+ 52 1 46,707 30 40 0 39,644 16
Total 8,351 100 157,084 100 26,088 100 243,516 100
Ave. Size 19 9
Source: Ghana Statistical Service, National Industrial Census 1987, Phase I Report, and 2005 National
Industrial Census Bulletin No. 1.
Note: Size categories and average size refer to employees per establishment.
Table 2: Manufacturing Employment in the Population Census
1984 2000 Growth
Empl. Share Empl. Share Rate
Wage Employees
Public 27,172 4.6 34,275 4.3 1.5
Private 65,931 11.2 100,174 12.7 2.6
Apprentices 25,332 4.3 78,834 10.0 7.1
Other 18,684 3.2 15,873 2.0 -1.0
Total Employed 137,119 23.3 229,156 29.1 3.2
Self-Employed
Without Employees 430,029 73.1 490,276 62.2 0.8
With Employees 21,270 3.6 68,636 8.7 7.3
Total Self-Employed 451,299 76.7 558,912 70.9 1.3
Total 588,418 100.0 788,068 100.0 1.8
Source: Author’s calculations based on published statistics from the Ghana Statistical Service census
reports 1984; 2000.
27Table 3: Firm Characteristics by Size Class
Micro Small Medium Large
No. Firms 72 77 73 58
No. Observations 854 924 846 676
Average Values:
Capital Labor Ratio (US$) 1,707.82 3,479.70 8,303.99 17,482.65
Implied Cost of Capital (% p.a.) 16.23 4.24 1.10 .58
Ave. Wage/Month (US$) 24.08 33.35 75.35 125.87
Ave. Yrs. Schooling 9.34 9.47 10.34 11.17
Exports (% Output) 1.87 3.80 6.89 26.77
Imported Inputs (% Total) 9.77 18.80 34.00 33.14
Percentage of Firms:
Unionized .00 12.99 55.22 94.44
State Owned .00 3.90 9.93 8.88
Foreign Owned 4.22 12.99 27.19 46.45
Percentage of Managers Citing:
Access to Credit 69.49 69.63 44.80 19.83
Interest Rates 3.39 7.41 13.60 25.00
Foreign Exchange 18.64 16.30 32.00 25.00
Import Competition 3.39 4.44 8.80 6.90
Size classes are based on the average size of the ﬁrm over all available years, and are deﬁned as follows:
micro, 1-9; small, 10-29; medium, 30-99; large, ≥ 100.
28Table 4: Firm Growth by Firm Size, GMES Sample
Categorized by Categorized by
Initial Empl. ‘Current’ Empl.
1-yr 4-yr 8-yr 1-yr 4-yr 8-yr
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Size Class 1 to 4 .472 .148 .087 -.002
(.133)∗∗∗ (.046)∗∗∗ (.030)∗∗∗ (.023)
Size Class 5 to 9 .104 .033 .032 -.011 -.004
(.032)∗∗∗ (.018)∗ (.022) (.016) (.009)
Size Class 10 to 19 .025 .041 .027 -.004 .0004 .0009
(.021) (.027) (.018) (.012) (.004) (.004)
Size Class 20 to 29 .033 .017 -.003 -.040 -.008 .001
(.031) (.021) (.010) (.024)∗ (.004)∗ (.003)
Size Class 30 to 49 .006 -.005 -.016 -.002 -.005 -.005
(.017) (.015) (.012) (.017) (.003) (.002)∗∗
Size Class 50 to 99 -.005 -.023 -.024 -.009 -.005 -.002
(.019) (.014)∗ (.017) (.017) (.003) (.002)
Size Class 100 to 199 -.002 -.020 -.012 .001 -.006 -.002
(.021) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.003)∗ (.002)
Size Class 200 to 499 .011 .007 -.006 .008 -.004 -.002
(.020) (.016) (.015) (.018) (.004) (.001)
Size Class > 500 -.061 -.043 -.026 -.035 -.002 -.001
(.036)∗ (.023)∗ (.014)∗ (.041) (.002) (.001)
Obs. 1778 1069 407 1778 1069 407
R2 .057 .054 .09 .002 .023 .05
The dependent variable is the net growth of employment within the ﬁrm over the time span indicated in
the ﬁrst row. Regressors consist of a set of dummies for each size class. In columns 1 to 3, size classes
are deﬁned on the basis of initial employment and thus subject to the ‘regression fallacy’. In columns 4
to 6 size classes are deﬁned on the basis of ‘current’ employment, following the deﬁnition proposed by
Davis, et al. 1996.
29Table 5: Firm Exit Probits, GMES Sample
(1) (2) (3)
Ln Empl -.171 -.165 -.231
(.057)∗∗∗ (.059)∗∗∗ (.086)∗∗∗
Firm Age -.018 -.041
(.017) (.018)∗∗









Obs. 500 500 500
R2 .025 .030 .115
All independent variables are measured at time t, except for employment which is measured by the
average of period t and t−1 values to adjust for possible employment shedding before exit. The dependent
variable is an indicator for ﬁrm exit between period t and t+2, i.e., the next biannual survey round. The










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1 10 100 1,000
employees
<1 yr 10-19 yrs
2-4 yrs 20-29 yrs
5-9 yrs 30+ yrs
Figure 1: The ‘life cycle of ﬁrms’ from a cross-sectional perspective. (Size distribution of the 2003

















1 10 100 1,000
employees
1984 - Full distribution



















1 10 100 1,000
employees
1988 - Full distribution
1988 - Destined to survive
2003 - Survivors
Ghana
Figure 2: Opposing patterns of ﬁrm growth and selection.
35Table 9: Credit Constraints & Firm Growth, GMES Sample
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Proﬁt .009 .055 -.028 .033
(.007) (.012)∗∗∗ (.018) (.030)
Log Proﬁt × Credit Const. .019 .0007 .093 .088
(.014) (.017) (.046)∗∗ (.047)∗
Credit Const. -.289 -1.244
(.180) (.606)∗∗
Firm FE Yes Yes
Obs. 1385 1385 1385 1385
R2 .026 .043 .021 .020
The dependent variable is the ﬁrst-diﬀerence of log employment in the ﬁrm. In addition to the regressors
listed, all equations include controls for ﬁrm age and a time trend. Equations without ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects
also include a full set of indicator variables for ﬁrm size classes (based on the average level of employment
as described in the text), sectors and regions. The instruments in columns 3 and 4 are the average value
within a ﬁrm’s size class, sector and region for each of the variables listed.
36T
a
b
l
e
1
0
:
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
:
M
u
l
t
i
n
o
m
i
a
l
L
o
g
i
t
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
o
f
t
h
e
R
e
v
e
r
s
e
T
r
a
n
s
i
t
i
o
n
M
a
t
r
i
x
,
N
I
C
S
a
m
p
l
e
1
6
-
Y
e
a
r
s
1
t
o
4
5
t
o
9
1
0
t
o
1
9
2
0
t
o
2
9
3
0
t
o
4
9
5
0
t
o
9
9
1
0
0
t
o
1
9
9
2
0
0
t
o
4
9
9
5
0
0
+
1
t
o
4
.
3
6
6
.
4
6
5
.
1
2
7
.
0
1
4
.
0
1
4
.
0
1
4
5
t
o
9
.
2
1
4
.
5
2
9
.
2
2
9
.
0
2
9
1
0
t
o
1
9
.
1
5
9
.
2
9
5
.
2
2
7
0
.
1
3
6
.
0
6
8
.
0
6
8
.
0
4
5
2
0
t
o
2
9
.
3
2
0
.
3
2
0
.
0
8
0
.
0
8
0
.
0
8
0
.
1
2
0
3
0
t
o
4
9
.
0
3
8
.
2
6
9
.
1
1
5
.
2
6
9
.
1
9
2
.
1
1
5
5
0
t
o
9
9
.
0
4
3
.
1
3
0
.
1
3
0
.
4
3
5
.
2
1
7
.
0
4
3
1
0
0
t
o
1
9
9
.
1
1
1
.
2
2
2
.
2
2
2
.
4
4
4
2
0
0
t
o
3
9
9
0
.
0
3
8
.
0
7
7
.
1
1
5
.
2
6
9
.
3
4
6
.
1
5
4
5
0
0
+
.
0
9
1
.
1
8
2
.
4
5
5
.
2
7
3
1
-
Y
e
a
r
1
t
o
4
5
t
o
9
1
0
t
o
1
9
2
0
t
o
2
9
3
0
t
o
4
9
5
0
t
o
9
9
1
0
0
t
o
1
9
9
2
0
0
t
o
4
9
9
5
0
0
+
1
t
o
4
.
9
1
7
.
0
8
3
-
.
0
0
5
-
.
0
0
2
.
0
0
6
-
.
0
0
2
-
.
0
0
1
.
0
0
9
-
.
0
0
5
5
t
o
9
.
0
3
3
.
9
2
6
.
0
4
7
.
0
0
5
-
.
0
0
9
.
0
0
2
.
0
0
8
-
.
0
2
2
.
0
1
1
1
0
t
o
1
9
.
0
1
7
.
0
5
2
.
8
8
5
.
0
1
5
.
0
2
5
-
.
0
0
2
-
.
0
2
5
.
0
6
0
-
.
0
2
7
2
0
t
o
2
9
.
0
0
1
.
0
3
8
.
0
1
6
.
9
1
4
-
.
0
0
6
.
0
3
0
.
0
6
5
-
.
0
9
8
.
0
4
0
3
0
t
o
4
9
.
0
0
0
-
.
0
3
2
.
0
6
1
.
0
3
6
.
8
9
8
.
0
3
4
.
0
1
8
-
.
0
2
5
.
0
1
0
5
0
t
o
9
9
.
0
1
7
-
.
0
1
5
-
.
0
1
5
.
0
3
0
.
0
0
7
.
9
5
1
.
0
4
5
-
.
0
3
2
.
0
1
1
1
0
0
t
o
1
9
9
-
.
0
5
6
.
0
5
4
.
0
9
3
-
.
1
0
7
.
0
5
4
-
.
0
2
2
.
8
9
0
.
1
2
5
-
.
0
3
1
2
0
0
t
o
3
9
9
.
0
3
7
-
.
0
3
1
-
.
0
6
7
.
0
6
8
.
0
0
4
.
0
1
8
.
0
4
2
.
8
8
8
.
0
4
1
5
0
0
+
-
.
0
2
3
.
0
1
5
.
0
4
3
-
.
0
3
5
-
.
0
2
1
.
0
1
2
.
0
1
7
.
0
9
2
.
8
9
9
T
h
e
l
e
f
t
c
o
l
u
m
n
l
i
s
t
s
e
n
d
i
n
g
s
i
z
e
s
a
n
d
t
h
e
t
o
p
r
o
w
l
i
s
t
s
s
t
a
r
t
i
n
g
s
i
z
e
s
.
E
n
t
r
i
e
s
i
n
t
h
e
t
a
b
l
e
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
r
o
w
p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
,
i
.
e
.
,
t
h
e
p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
t
h
a
t
a
ﬁ
r
m
e
n
d
i
n
g
i
n
a
g
i
v
e
n
r
o
w
b
e
g
a
n
i
n
a
g
i
v
e
n
c
o
l
u
m
n
.
A
l
l
r
o
w
s
s
u
m
t
o
o
n
e
.
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
a
r
e
b
a
s
e
d
o
n
a
m
u
l
t
i
n
o
m
i
a
l
l
o
g
i
t
m
o
d
e
l
o
f
t
r
a
n
s
i
t
i
o
n
s
o
v
e
r
1
6
y
e
a
r
s
.
T
h
e
b
o
t
t
o
m
p
a
n
e
l
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
s
t
h
e
1
6
t
h
r
o
o
t
o
f
t
h
e
m
a
t
r
i
x
i
n
t
h
e
t
o
p
p
a
n
e
l
,
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
e
d
b
y
t
h
e
D
e
n
m
a
n
-
B
e
a
v
e
r
s
1
9
7
6
a
l
g
o
r
i
t
h
m
.
37